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Abstract
The Rosse-Panzar statistic is used to test for market conduct and contes ability
within the UK building society mortgage market between 1990 and 1995. The statistic
considers the distinction between monopolistic competition and profit maximising
monopoly. Following  Panzar and Rosse (1987), analysis of monopolistic competition can
be seen to be concerned with both an individual and a group equilibrium. The comparative
static approach of the Rosse-Panzar statistic is employed to test for this situation.
Evidence of long-run competitive equilibrium or profit maximising monopoly is rejected.
Presence of a contestable market with monopolistic competition is not rejected. The
stability of incumbents market share is employed to test for a small firms bias (Shaffe ,
1982). Evidence of a small firms bias is rejected.
Introduction
During the 1990s the UK building society sector has undergone many regulatory
and structural changes. Paramount amongst such developments has been the
intensification of competition in the mortgage market as a rang  of proprietary institutions
have entered this market. Accounting for such change, an empirical analysis of the
competitive conditions prevalent in the building society mortgage market is deemed
timely.
The 1986 Building Societies Act (Section 5) specifies that building societies are
established “ ... for the purpose of raising, primarily through subscriptions of members, a
stock or fund for making them advances secured on land for their residential use”. Thus
building societies may be viewed as acting principally as i termediators of savings (term,
share and investment deposits) into mortgage loans. Due to the distinct mutual ownership
form of building societies, the customers or members are the de f cto owners of the
society. This mutual ownership form differs from the proprietary form of many of the new
entrants to the market in that shareholders are not present, reducing the demands on the
resources of building societies. This distinct ownership structure coupled with the discrete
regulation of building societies have enabled building societies to consistently provide
lower cost mortgages, making building society mortgages a historically distinct mortgage
service, in the UK.
This paper employs an intermediation model (see Sea ey and Lindley, 1977) of
bank production to quantify the conduct and behaviour within the building society
mortgage market for the sample period, 1990-95. Contestability theory (Baumol et a,
1982) is used to generalise differences in the conduct of firms. Presence of market conduct
forms including monopolistic competition and long-run competitive equilibrium are tested
with the Rosse-Panzar statistic (Panzar and Rosse, 1987).
Consideration of contestability theory is deemed appropriate in light of the recent
developments in this market. The new entrants of the 1980s, to the mortgage market,
particularly the specialised mortgage lenders and banks, may have contributed to the
reduced profitability and the large losses that characterising the building society sector the
early 1990s. These entrants may be characterised both by their proprietary form and to a
lesser extent the brevity of their presence in the mortgage market. Previous evidence,
using the Rosse-Panzar statistic for the UK retail bank loan market indicates conditions of
monopolistic competition (Molyneux et al 1994). Broader surveys of the inefficiency and
performance of depository institutions and European banking markets are considered by
Hardwick and Ashton (1996) and Molyneux et al (1996) respectively.
Contestable market theory and monopolistic competition
Contestability theory (Baumol et a, 1982) can be viewed as a special case of
classical competitive market theory. The theory was proposed to generalise differences in
market structure and as a powerful tool for improving the regulation of industry. It is
suggested that " ... perhaps the most noteworthy implication of contes ability theory is that
a wide difference in appearance between a particular market and the form of perfect
competition need not deprive the invisible hand of its power to protect the public interest"
(Baumol et al, 1982 pp.447). The influential nature of this theory within economics has
been described as " ... a 'rebellion' which does without benefit of the conjectural variation,
reaction functions, and other paraphernalia of standard oligopoly analysis" (Baumol, 1982,
pp.1).
Contestability emphasises the assumption that an 'imperfect' industrial structure
may allow a long run competitive equilibrium to form. This is hypothesised to occur
through the potential entry of competing firms to the market during disequilib ium.
Anticipated competition, both real or imaginary, is viewed to engender competitive
behaviour of incumbents with a market. Central aspects of c ntestability may be defined as
the static form of the model, hypothesised free entry and exit of institutions to the
marketplace with no consideration of time lag for retaliation or sunk costs, and the
assumption that potential entrants to the market are price takers, freely accepting the
present incumbents' previous entry prices. Thus " ... the critical feature of a contestable
market is its vulnerability to hit and run entry" (Martin, 1993, pp.300).
The theory of contestability applied to monopolistic competition, developed by
Chamberlin in 1933, may be viewed as contradictory. Chamberlin suggested that product
differentiation is the distinguishing characteristic of this market conduct. Product
differentiation is achieved through such factors as " ... quality, design, color or style”,
where " ... in so far as these and other intangible factors vary from seller to seller, the
'product' in each case is different” (pp.56). Baumol et al amended for this by suggesting
that an " ... entrant can closely or exactly duplicate the product design of the firm
depicted", (pp.332) or if each variant is sold by at least two suppliers, perfect
contestability will lead to marginal cost pricing. Martin (1993) considers this revision in
greater depth.
Firms within a monopolistic market selling differentiated products can be viewed
to be qualitatively indistinguishable from classical profit maximising monopolists at the
firm level. To elaborate this point, Chamberlin emphasised that as “ ... long as the
substitutes are to any degree imperfect, he (the firm) still has a monopoly of his own
product and control over its price within the limits imposed upon any monopolist - those
of demand" (pp.67). The mortgage provider is therefore assumed to provide a financial
service with distinct characteristics. The provision of a mortgage with these exact
characteristics is possible only through the one mortgage provider. Thus at the firm level a
monopolistically competitive firm and a monopolist are indistinguishable. Following
Baumol, whilst characteristics may be viewed as distinct on a firm level, at the industry
level substitute characteristics, deemed equivalent by the consumer, may be incorporated
within the service by other incumbent providers. The distinction between monopolistic
competition and profit maximising monopoly may then be observed at the group or
industry level. Analysis of monopolistic competition can be seen to be concerned with
both an individual equilibrium and a group equilibrium (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). To test
for this situation the comparative static approach of the Rosse-Panzar statistic is
employed.
The Rosse-Panzar statistic.
A Rosse-Panzar statistic may be used to test for long run competitive equilibrium
and monopolistic competition or long-run Chamberlinian equilibrium. Through employing
firm level observations a general quantification of market conduct may be made. The
testing procedure is undertaken in two stages. Validity of the overall or competitive
equilibrium test demands the sample be in long-run equilibrium. Presence of long run
equilibrium is initially tested. The competitive environment statistic, which may then be
quantified, can be viewed as the sum of firm level elasticities of average revenue with
respect to input prices. If the sum of elasticities, termed H within the literature, is
significantly different from one then long run competitive equilibrium is rejected. A value
between zero and unity indicates monopolistic competition or long-run Chamberlinian
competition cannot be rejected. The differing interpretations of the H statistic, summarised
by Molyneux et al  (1994), are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1 Interpretations of the H statistic
Competitive environment test Equilibrium test




0<H<1 Monopolistic competition 0 = Equilibrium
H=1 Perfect competition, or
H=1 Natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable
market, or
H=1 Sales maximising firm subject to a break-
even constraint
Molyneux et al (1994)
How the statistic enables testing for distinct forms of market conduct and
behaviour may be explained intuitively. More rigorous 'proofs' of the statistic are
contained within Shaffer (1982), Panzar and Rosse, (1987) and Nathan and Neave (1989).
The H statistic quantifies the impact on average revenue or output price of a proportional
increase in all input prices. Average cost is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in input
prices so a one per cent increase in input prices will inflate average costs by one per cent
for all output levels. The symmetry assumption is imposed a priori an  presupposes that
the quantity of output produced will not vary with differing forms of market conduct.
Under monopolistic competition or large group Chamberlinian equilibrium, a rise
in average costs would initially limit output and in turn reduce revenue. Through imposing
the a priori assumption that the elasticity of demand of a firm under symmetric
monopolistic competition will increase with the number of substitutes for a product, the
degree of ‘competitiveness’ or 'contestability' of the market may be quantified. Thus the
value of the H statistic between zero and unity should indicate the degree of control
incumbent firms possess over their differentiated product markets, the degree to which
shifts in the market demand curve affect the reduced form revenues, or the contestability
of the market. A lower value of H will indicate a higher level of control over differentiated
product markets or a lower level of contestability.
Under long-run competitive equilibrium an increase in average costs will, in the
short-term, reduce revenues, leading to the exit of incumbents. This exit will increase the
demand for the remaining incumbents. Following established theory, in the long run, an
unchanged equilibrium level of output is expected. A proportional increase in revenue for
the remaining incumbents will give a value of unity for the H statistic.
 A number of potential difficulties with the statistic have been suggested. Shaffer
(1982) emphasised the importance of considering firms operating within the same market.
He also stressed that the presence of many small firms may disguise the presence of
disequilibrium. This would cause the estimate of H to fall and make a negative value more
likely, regardless of the conduct prevalent within the market. Following recommendations
made by Shaffer, the stability of market shares within the sample over the sample period
are examined to test if such bias is occurring. When the market shares display stability a
bias by the small firms effect may be rejected. When instability is recognised, a small firms
effect may be present leading to lower than expected H statistic results. Additionally, the
limited definition of the production process denoted by the truncated functional form, may
be viewed as a blunt approximation of the true productive technology (Perrakis, 1991).
Previous studies
Nathan and Neave (1989) applied the Rosse-Panzar statistic for a sample of
Canadian financial institutions. Cross-sectional samples of 14 schedule A and 58 schedule
B banks and 39 trust companies are considered for 1982 and 1984.  Monopolistic
behaviour is indicated for Canadian financial institutions. Molyneux et al (1994) used the
Rosse-Panzar statistic to assess competitive conditions in a number of European banking
markets. This broad ranging study incorporates a number of controls for risk, cost and size
characteristics of the institutions considered. A sample of German, French, Italian, Spanish
and UK banks were considered between 1986-89. The study indicates that monopolistic
competition exists within the UK banking market (a result of 0.628 was recorded for the
Rosse-Panzar statistic). Similar results were obtained for the other European markets.
Data
A balanced data set of 77 building societies between 1990 to 1995 is employed.
The data, drawn from Annual Reports and Accounts of the building societies, is pooled
for two periods of 1990-1992 and 1993-1995 and deflated for 1993 prices by the RPI.
Average levels of building society profit are variable over the sample period. An average
profit of approximately £16m was enjoyed between 1990 and 1991 across the 77
societies. A considerable rise in average profits is recorded for 1994 and 1995, when
levels of £22m are achieved. Interest payable and receivable, both overall and specifically
on retail deposits and non-retail deposits have displayed a gradual decline. This trend
mirrors the underlying interest rate prevailing within the economy as a whole. The
differential between interest received and interest payable rises over the period from £46m
in 1991 to £64m in 1995 indicating an overall rise of nearly 40 per cent over the entire
period. This change is perhaps an indication of the instability of interest rates, a reduction
in the level of competition or a move towards greater internal reserve generation.
Model specification
To investigate competitive conditions a revenue function is specified, assuming an
intermediation model of bank production (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977). It is assumed
that mortgage loans are produced using labour, capital and deposits. Revenue from
mortgages is the interest receivable on mortgages. The model form employed follows the
approach performed by Mol neux et al (1994). This enables a comparison of our results
with the estimations for the UK r tail banking sector.
The equilibrium test employed is similar to those used in previous studies (for
example Molyneux et al, 1994, Shaffer, 1982 and Nathan and Neave, 1989). The
equilibrium test is based on the assumption that within equilibrium long run competitive
capital markets will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across financial institutions. It
would therefore be expected that in equilibrium the rates of return should not be
correlated with input prices. This is tested by imposing return on assets (ROA) as the
dependant variable in the regression equation.
Equilibrium test
LnROA = a + bLnPL + cLnPK + dLnPF + jLnAss + fLnCapass + hLnLoanass
Competitive environment test
LnTrass = a + bLnPL + cLnPK + dLnPF + jLnAss + fLnCapass + hLnLoanass
Where:
Ln = Logarithm
Trass = Total mortgage interest revenue per pound sterling of 
total assets (Average revenue)
ROA = Return on assets (Ratio of profits after tax to total 
assets)
PL = Labour expense per full time employee
PK = Capital expenses per pound of fixed assets
PF = Ratio of retail fund interest payable to total retail funds (unit price of retail
funds)
Ass = Total assets
LoanAss = Mortgage to assets ratio
Capass = Ratio of provision for bad and doubtful debts to total 
assets
A number of environmental variables are included within the revenue function to
control of firm specific and external factors that may be associated with revenue. By
controlling for factors that may systematically vary with the dependant variables
estimation bias may be reduced. Total assets are used to control for different building
society sizes and potential economies of scale. L anAss considers the loans to assets ratio
enabling insight into the relationship between the proportion of loans and revenue. Cap ss
uses the level of provisions for bad and doubtful debts as proxy for the level of risky
behaviour of the building society. This variable is devised to control of the potentially
higher or lower profits that may be associated with risky behaviour.
Results
Parameter estimates, diagnostic statistics and H statistics are displayed in Table 2.
Recorded levels of T statistics and diagnostic statistics indicate an acceptable degree of
specification error. The labour coefficient is positive for both periods yet significant for
only 1995. Estimates for the capital price coefficient are indecisive. The deposit price
coefficient is significant and positive for both periods indicating the relative importance of
this input within the revenue function. The control for total asset size appears indecisive,
shifting sign between the time periods. The Capass coefficient appears positive. This result
broadly indicates the level of provisions for risky loans and revenue may be positively
correlated. The Loansass variable is positive for both periods and significant for one,
weakly indicating the proportion of loans and revenue may be positively correlated. The
equilibrium test indicates significant d sequilibrium for 1990-1992. Equilibrium is not
rejected for 1993-1995. The results indicate only weak inference may be drawn for the
disequilibrium period. The competitive environment H test allows rejection of long-run
competitive equilibrium for both time periods. A degree of monopolistic competition may




a -0.7043 (0.6810)* -1.0827 (0.1281)*
b  0.0041 (0.0053)  0.00828 (0.0051)*
c -0.0077 (0.0079)  0.0021 (0.0081)
d   0.5611 (0.0223)*  0.4940 (0.0346)*
f -0.0089 (0.0023)*  0.0103 (0.00205)*
j  0.5053 (0.0402)*  0.4928 (0.0366)*
h  0.0041 (0.0012)*  0.0157 (0.0016)*
Equilibrium test
a -2.195 (0.4837)* -5.7201 (0.7132)*
b -0.0885 (0.0376)* -0.0437 (0.0285)
c -0.0384 (0.0559) -0.0227 (0.0449)
d  0.4774 (0.1583)* -0.1674 (0.0193)*
f -0.0765 (0.0164)*  0.0037 (0.0114)
j  1.497 (0.2854)*  0.2802 (0.2037)
h -0.0077 (0.0082)*  0.0032 (0.0087)
Competitive environment testEquilibrium test
1990-1992 Adj. R2  = 0.8403 Adj. R2  = 0.185
1993-1995 Adj. R2  = 0.565 Adj. R2  = 0.016
1990-1992 F statistic = 208.01* F statistic = 9.91*
1993-1995 F statistic = 52.2* F statistic = 1.64
1990-1992 Durbin Watson = 1.954 Durbin Watson = 2.1213
1993-1995 Durbin Watson = 2.01 Durbin Watson = 2.1915
1990-1992 Log Likelihood = 311.652 Log Likelihood = -153.15
1993-1995 Log Likelihood = 330.071 Log Likelihood = -76.824
Competitive environment testEquilibrium test
1990-1992 0.5647  (0.0231) 0.3505     (0.164)*
1993-1995 0.5044  (0.03604) -0.2338   (0.2006)
* = 10% significance
Market stability may be viewed as the dynamic position of the firm in a market.
The degree of market stability of incumbents market share is quantified with three
methods. First, a sum of absolute changes in market shares for the building society
mortgage market for the top 5, 10 and 15 building societies is taken, following the method
used by Hardwick (1996). Secondly, the correlation of market share and ranks in the
mortgage market in different years is made. Thirdly, testing of independence of market
share in the mortgage market between different years is performed using the Wilcoxian-
Mann-Whitney test.
Results of the tests are presented in Table 3. The sum of absolute changes in
market shares indicates the low level of absolute change in market share amongst the
largest incumbent building societies within the sample period. The correlation results of
ranks of market share are presented in the higher right segment of the table, and market
share are presented in the lower left segment of the table. Both set of statistics indicate
high levels of correlation between different years in the building society mortgage market
and only a slight decline from very high levels of correlation over time. The Wilcoxian-
Mann-Whitney test is applied to test for whether the market shares for a specific year have
been drawn from the same population as another year. The alternative directional
hypothesis is that one year is stochastically larger than another. The null hypothesis is not
rejected for all tests with 0.01 significance, indicating stability of market share over the
sample period.
Table 3 Tests of the small firms effect
Sum of absolute changes in market shares
Top 5 Top 10 Top 15
1990-1991 -0.1710 0.0003  0.1020
1991-1992 -01355 0.0130  0.0053
1992-1993 -0.0411 0.0346  0.0138
1993-1994 -0.0774 0.0127 -0.0018
1994-1995  0.3232 0.1192  0.0685
Correlation of market shares and market share ranks
Rank
Market share
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1990 - 0.9989 0.9984 0.9970 0.9961 0.9937
1991 0.9992 - 0.9993 0.9980 0.9974 0.9948
1992 0.9981 0.9995 - 0.9999 0.9981 0.9954
1993 0.9981 0.9992 0.9996 - 0.9993 0.9965
1994 0.9976 0.9980 0.9981 0.9981 - 0.9967
1995 0.9835 0.9783 0.9977 0.9802 0.9844 -
The Wilcoxian-Mann-Whitney test
Z 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1990 - -0.0418 -0.0296 -0.0767 -0.1028 -0.3642
1991 -0.0418 - -0.0557 -0.0418 -0.0610 -0.3102
1992 -0.0296 -0.0557. - -0.1011 -0.1150 -0.3869
1993 -0.0767 -0.0418 -0.1011 - -0.0279 -0.2946
1994 -0.1028 -0.0610 -0.1150 -0.0279 - -0.2789
1995 -0.3642 -0.3102 -0.3869 -0.2946 -0.2789 -
Conclusions
The study indicates monopolistically competitive conduct is present in the UK
building society mortgage market during the 1990s. The building society mortgage market
may be viewed as displaying a degree of contestability over the sample period. Such a
result occurs at a time of rising profitability of the sector as a whole, further indicating the
lack of long run competitive equilibrium of sales maximisation under a break even
constraint. Bias in the Rosse-Panzar statistic resulting from instability in market share of
building societies is rejected. The UK building society mortgage market appears to be
operating under similar competitive conditions as the UK retail bank loan market. The
slightly lower level of contestability within the building societies mortgage market may
indicate perhaps the superior performance or competitive advantage of mutual building
societies within their core market.
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